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At the end of October, 2007, the story of the “Darfur orphans”2 – a hundred 
children, aged one to ten, “kidnapped” from their West African homes by 
members of a French NGO with the telling name of Zoe’s Ark – was splashed 
across the headlines of every leading newspaper in Brazil. From then on 
until early January, in their daily papers and on major television networks, 
Brazilians accompanied the fate of these NGOers as they were arrested (at the 
Chadian airport from which they were embarking), tried and condemned to 
seven years hard labor before being extradited back to France. Newscasters re-
ferred to rumors that the children, lured with false promises from their native 
homes, were destined to the mafia of organ transplants or pedophilia. At the 
very least, the children were to be “sold” for high gains to French and Belgian 
families. Thus, it was no surprise to hear that “thousands” of Sudanese had 
gathered in Khartoum to protest against the European menace to their chil-
dren or that, by December, citizens of Chad (where the trials took place) were 
thronging at the door of the French embassy to demand exemplary punish-
ment for all those involved. The president of Zoe’s Ark had announced earlier 
in the year that his organization, through “Operation Children’s Rescue”, 
would be saving up to ten thousand orphans of the Darfur-Sudanese war 
from famine and probable early death. However, after the October arrests, 
few still believed in this claimed altruism. A UNICEF spokeswoman pointed 
out that the organization’s activities had transpired in clear violation of the 
International The Hague Convention on international adoption. 
1  Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, claudialwfonseca@gmail.com.
2  The quotation marks are to underline the fact that – as journalists soon discovered – most children 
involved in the incident were not orphans, nor were they from Darfur.
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Although it concerns an event that occurred many thousands of kilome-
ters away, involving nationals of other countries, the “Darfur orphans” in-
cident serves, ironically, as an appropriate introduction to our reflection on 
adoption policies and practices in Brazil. In the first place, it highlights the 
globalized nature of opinion-forming media. There was no doubt nothing 
exceptional to the Brazilian interest in this scandal involving the “traffic of 
children”. Throughout most countries in the world, people were listening to 
similar journalistic reports that included speculation about the Europeans’ 
colonialist attitudes, comments on a possible dark side to “humanitarian” 
aid, and analysis of international documents pertaining to the international 
adoption of children. In the second place, the “Darfur orphans” incident un-
derlines a certain aspect of the dynamics of governance in today’s world that 
we intend to demonstrate in the following paragraphs: the manner in which 
apparently private conflicts concerning children and their caretakers have 
come under worldwide scrutiny, marking a clear global presence in seem-
ingly local matters. Put in other terms, it inspires reflection on how particu-
lar constructions of “the irregular” (Leifsen 2006) are used to forge instru-
ments of governance.
According to my frame of reference, change is never the simple result of 
global trends. Although one may speak of certain evolving “global forms” of 
childcare policy -- phenomena “that have a distinctive capacity for decontex-
tualization and recontextualization, abstractability and movement, across 
diverse social and cultural situations and spheres of life” -- these forms only 
become pertinent to policy and practice when articulated as concrete “as-
semblages” in specific, territorialized situations (Ong and Collier 2005: 11). As 
N.Rose points out, these real-life results often bear little resemblance to the 
neat projection of policy planners:
This is not a matter of the implementation of idealized schema in the real by an 
act of will, but of the complex assemblage [of diverse forces, techniques, and 
devices] that promise to regulate decisions and actions of individuals, groups, 
organizations in relation to authoritative criteria. (2006: 148)
In an effort to understand the “technologies of government” tailored to 
smooth out certain conflicts in the Brazilian child rights scenario over the 
past twenty years, this article traces the intertwining dynamics of “external” 
inputs (such as those represented by international legal conventions), “local” 
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specialists (including social workers, NGO volunteers, and judicial officials), 
and the media. However, it should soon become clear that the horizontal and 
relational processes that crisscross the globe implode images of global versus 
local, as well as any idea of unidirectional flow. Global forms operate through 
transnational circuits in which goods, people and ideas pass through medi-
ating situations that do not simply transport meanings, but rather, “trans-
form, translate, distort, and modify the meaning of the elements they carry” 
(Latour 2005: 39). The process of mediation implies change for all sides of 
the process. If local policies bear the mark of international legislation, this 
legislation also reflects, to varying degrees, the concerns of activists rooted 
in their own national setting. If the 1980s “hemorrhage” of children out 
from “sending countries” has radically changed childcare policies as well 
as notions of nationhood within those countries, so, in Europe and North 
America, the flood of children adopted overseas – who grow up side by side 
with African, Latin American and Asian immigrant children -- pose ques-
tions of nationhood and belonging at the “receiving” end of the process (see 
Howell 2006, Yngvesson, 2007). 
Throughout this paper, we trace through the reversible flows – the play 
of mutual influences – between Brazilian and international sites that pro-
duce relatively consensual results. At the end of our discussion, we briefly 
return to the theme of “traffic” in adopted children, framing it as a contro-
versy that reveals certain latent tensions for which “evident” solutions have 
yet to be found. 
Locating examples of abuse 
The conflict that pits nationals against foreigners (or “national adoption” 
against “intercountry adoption”) gains ready visibility in clashes such as 
that of the Darfur orphans. High-placed statesmen get involved, and news-
papers revel in inflamed rhetoric underlining sentiments of national honor. 
Nonetheless, there is another possible focus of conflict here – that between 
child-givers and child-receivers – which occurs in any sort of adoption. In 
the case of the Darfur orphans, the mismatched frames of reference are ob-
vious: legal adoption, as it is known in France, does not exist in the Muslim 
world. The Chadian driver who served as intermediary in the recruitment 
of children swears he had not understood that the children would be taken 
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out of the country to live permanently removed from their original families. 
His misunderstanding of the situation calls to mind another similar episode 
of a youngster from a Malawi orphanage adopted by the American pop star, 
Madonna. Journalists, discovering that the child was not an “authentic” or-
phan, located and interviewed the boy’s father. The man, at first complacent 
– and even grateful – to see his son taken in by a well-off foreigner, gradually 
changed his tone, alleging he had never understood that his child would be 
permanently removed from his existence. 
Brazilian newscasters, in their cool appraisals of the Chadian incident, 
imply an enormous distance between problems “over there”, in less developed 
regions of Africa, and the modern nation of Brazil. Today, the priority is-
sues in child welfare are different. Citing concerns voiced by representatives 
of UNICEF or UNESCO, journalists are apt to run stories on the impressive 
number of murdered youth in Brazil (many, victims of the drug wars), child 
abuse, or the sexual exploitation of children and adolescents. Intercountry 
adoption, as fodder for potential scandal, has dropped virtually out of sight. 
What the media fails to recall is that scarce twenty years ago, Brazil was one 
of the world’s leading exporters of internationally adopted children, and well 
into the 90s, the country was subject to periodic scandals and often exagger-
ated accusations about the “sale” or even “dismantling” of orphans for the 
benefit of foreign adopters (Fonseca 2002). 
The “Mothers of Jundiai”, a movement begun by a rag-tail group of fami-
lies living in a small town not 60 kilometers from the bustling metropolis of 
São Paulo, was responsible for bringing the most recent (and perhaps last) 
large-scale scandal to public attention3. Starting in March of 1998, a group 
of protesters, wearing green ribbons on their shoulders and carrying photos 
of their lost children, would gather every Monday on the steps of their lo-
cal court house, to demand information on the whereabouts and, hopefully, 
the return of their youngsters. These lower-income women (and some men) 
– compared by journalists to the Argentine madres de la plaza de majo – had 
banded together to protest the “abduction” of their children by the local 
judge. Newspapers and weekly magazines gave considerable coverage to this 
movement, delving into detail through investigative reporting. It thus came 
to the fore that, over the previous six years, 484 of the town’s children had 
3  See Cardarello (2007) for a detailed ethnographic analysis of this movement.
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been given in adoption, nearly half, destined to homes in foreign countries, 
and most without their family’s consent4. 
According to the original judicial evaluations, none of the families ap-
pear to conform to middle-class family standards. One mother, it was pointed 
out, had three children by three different fathers, another, whose companion 
had disappeared, was only 14 when her child was born; others were accused of 
being prostitutes or alcoholics or drug-addicts. In many cases, following the 
tradition of “child circulation” -- a sort of informal fosterage common among 
working-class populations in Brazil and other parts of Latin America ever 
since colonial times (Leifsen 2006, Leinaweaver 2008, Fonseca 2004), the chil-
dren were living with surrogate parents (uncles and aunts, grandparents, god-
parents…) chosen by their mother. The judge, backed by the cursory evidence 
collected by court assistants of similar persuasion, took such placements as a 
sign of abandonment. Compounded with what he saw as the child’s precari-
ous moral and economic living conditions (most of the accusations of physi-
cal abuse never panned out), he presented journalists with laconic justifica-
tion for the high number of expedited adoptions: “I can’t condone the fact of 
a stripper living in the same house as the child”; “the children were living in 
the worst possible conditions of hygiene”; “the [original] family did not offer 
conditions for a dignified life” (Isto É, 13-5-98.). Acting, for the most part, in 
connection with a reputable Italian adoption agency, the judge insisted that 
his decisions had been guided solely by the children’s best interest.
The fleeting movement of birth families (which lasted barely more than 
a year) certainly would not have received so much attention had the field not 
been previously prepared by a decade of scandal in the papers and debate by 
child rights activists, going hand in hand with legislative changes. In fact, 
the heyday of scandal was in the 80s and early 90s, when, in reaction to a 
high number of precariously-regulated adoptions by foreigners, accusations 
linked real and documented cases of “traffic in orphans” across national bor-
ders, to “the traffic of [human] organs”. In 1988, the theme was included in 
the agenda of a Congressional Parliamentary Inquest, and, throughout Brazil, 
the federal police opened a record number of investigations on intercountry 
adoptions. The mood was ripe for the massive wave of legal investigations of 
any lawyer, orphanage administrator, maternity ward nurse or charity worker 
4  See Isto É, 13-5-98 e 25-11-98, 19-5-99; Epoca 31-08-98,
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who had served as go-between in an adoption involving foreigners. With jail 
sentences and other sanctions being meted out, public opinion underwent an 
about-face, causing an abrupt fall in the potential status of such agents from 
“child-savers” to “child-traffickers” (see Abreu 2002). As of 1994, intercountry 
adoption, on the wane ever since the 1990 Children’s Code, began its defini-
tive decline, bringing the number of children thus leaving the country from 
2143 in 1990 to under 500 at the decade’s end (Fonseca 2002).
The “Mothers of Jundiai” thus stands as a sort of swan song of scandals 
involving intercountry adoptions in Brazil. From the protestors’ point of 
view, the results were not particularly rewarding. The government officials 
involved were never censured. (The judge was moved to another district 
where he no longer deals with children’s affairs. After being absolved by his 
peers in the judiciary, he proceeded to sue the news vehicles who had sul-
lied his image.) Even more discouraging – not more than a handful of the 
youngsters, and none who were adopted abroad, returned to their families. 
Notwithstanding the paltry results of this group protest on the individual 
level, we suggest that the episode exerted an important influence on public 
policy dealing with children from impoverished households. For this to hap-
pen, however, local activists would be obliged to muster “external ammuni-
tion” for this local struggle.
Globalized regulations settle in: Intercountry tensions recede 
At the end of the 1980s, the first reaction of Brazilian policymakers to the ear-
ly scandals involving foreign adopters had been to revamp national legisla-
tion. Up until this point the wide-spread practice of child circulation had sel-
dom been brought to the attention of government authorities. Those adults 
wishing to officialize their relation to a youngster they were raising would 
simply take out a birth certificate as though the child were their biological 
son or daughter. In the 80s, this sort of “ideological falsification” known as 
adoção à brasileira (or adoption Brazilian way), was thought to be much more 
common than any form of legal child placement. Although illegal, the prac-
tice was generally tolerated by judicial authorities who took the parents` 
“noble motivations” as an attenuating factor (Abreu 2002). Scandals over in-
tercountry adoptions brought child placement practices into the limelight, 
urging a tighter control over irregularities.
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The scandals, one should remember, coincided with the ascendance of 
the judiciary, called upon throughout the Western world to settle an ever 
greater array of matters in the private sphere (Santos 2000). Brazilians had 
their own particular reasons for casting their hopes with the new “rule by 
law”. During the 1980s, with the ebbing of the country’s twenty-year mili-
tary dictatorship, social movements bourgeoned. The mobilization of such 
varied categories as landless peasants, metallurgical workers, street chil-
dren, and housewives in the slums resulted in wide popular participation 
in discussions geared toward a new Constitution (Caldeira and Holston 
2006). Child rights activists organized nation-wide discussions not only to 
guarantee proper space in the 1988 Constitution5, but – even more impor-
tantly – to elaborate a new Children’s Code (1990). Coming on the heels of 
the 1989 UN Convention for the Rights of the Child6, the Code – seen as 
“even more advanced” than the international document – inspired constant 
and favorable comparison. 
The principle of the paramount interest of children and adolescents 
now justified the eradication of simple adoption in which children main-
tained membership in both their biological and adoptive families, with 
limited inheritance rights in the latter. At the same time that it guaranteed 
the child’s irrevocable and full rights in its new adoptive family, the 1990 
Children’s Code decreed the complete erasure of the child’s original family. 
However, now, thanks to the “subsidiary principle” stating that intercountry 
adoption should be seen as an exceptional measure resorted to only after all 
in-country alternatives had been exhausted, adoption would not normally 
imply a rupture in the child’s national belonging. The directives were essen-
tially the same that would dominate major United Nations legislation for-
mulated three years later at the 1993 Hague Conference on the Protection of 
Children and Co-operation in respect of inter-country adoption. Aside from 
stating that children might be adopted abroad only after all in-country so-
lutions had been exhausted, the document affirms the child’s right to phys-
ical, psychological and moral integrity, including the preservation of his or 
her identity (ECA, art. 17)7.
5  Article 227 states the child’s right to “total protection”.
6  Promptly ratified by Brazil on November 21, 1990.
7  One should note, however, that whereas the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child declares a 
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Perhaps because the Hague document was seen as a repetition of exist-
ing national legislation, the Brazilian government’s adhesion was not im-
mediate. The subsidiary principle, however, was not implemented in like 
fashion throughout all Brazil. In certain regions (especially those connected 
with scandals in the media), state commissions for international adoption 
were quickly set up, bringing together leading citizens with members of the 
judiciary. However, in other places, such as the state of São Paulo, authori-
ties dragged their feet. With the Jundiai scandal, it became evident that even 
the supposedly more advanced parts of the country were subject to slip-
page and that the Children’s Code alone would not assure adequate control 
of intercountry adoption. It is thus no surprise that in July of 1999, with the 
“Mothers of Jundiai” still fresh in the memory of policymakers, Brazil finally 
ratified the 1993 Hague Conference. 
From then on, the government wasted no time in implementing the 
Convention’s mandates. In 2000, a “Central Authority” for the regulation 
of intercountry adoption was set up within the new Special Committee on 
Human Rights, directly under the supervision of the President’s Office. By 
2005, in its answers to a questionnaire designed by the Special Commission 
of the Hague Convention, Brazilian authorities reported that, with the excep-
tion of certain ill-equipped regions in the North of Brazil, the Convention 
was being faithfully applied (2005)8. That same year, they edited new guide-
lines for the accreditation of foreign agencies dealing in the adoption of 
Brazilian children. Significantly, at the beginning of 2008, all 34 foreign 
accredited agencies were seated in countries that had ratified the Hague 
Convention. Agencies from the U.S. – a country which has not adhered to the 
Convention – were pointedly absent. 
Interestingly enough, the number of intercountry adoptions of Brazilian 
children has begun to slowly climb after the implementation of the internation-
al directives, as though local authorities – admitting increasingly centralized 
supervision – feel less vulnerable to criticism. In this case, moving the “centers 
of calculation” further from home appears to have been an efficient mode of risk 
child’s right to the preservation of identity, national, name and family relations (art. 8), the Brazilian 
ECA concentrates on the child’s (individual) identity, omitting any mention of family relations.
8  See Brazil’s response to the Hague QUESTIONNAIRE on the Practical Operation of the 
Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of 
Intercountry Adoption on www.hcch.net/upload/adop2005_br.pdf (consulted 20 July, 2009).
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management (Rose 2006). The present situation no longer lends itself to scare 
signals about foreigners stealing away the country’s next generation. 
From the subsidiary principle to “necessary adoptions” 
It is hard to get a handle on the “local” specificities of an issue while re-
maining glued to the national scene. Globalized influences – references to 
the Hague Convention, scandals in the media, etc. – are easily apparent in the 
speech of local actors. However, it takes a comparative analysis involving data 
from a number of different countries to bring out national particularities. 
The British researcher, Peter Selman (2009), furnishes just this sort of materi-
al in his demographic analysis of the trends in intercountry adoption between 
1998 and 2004 in twenty receiving states. In considering this data, it comes as 
no surprise that Brazil has long since disappeared from the list of significant 
donor countries. The intriguing fact, however, is the advanced age of those 
few children (under 500 a year) who leave Brazil with foreign adoptive par-
ents. Whereas 94% of the Korean children adopted into foreign homes are un-
der one year of age, and 97.5% of the Chinese adoptees have not yet celebrated 
their fifth birthday, 65% of the Brazilian children adopted abroad are over five 
years old. No other country appears to have come close to the seriousness of 
Brazil in applying the Hague Conference’s “subsidiary” principle. 
How did this orthodox application of the Hague Conference come about? 
Certainly, the progressive centralization of adoption processes in the hands 
of Juvenile Courts made it easier to supervise and implement the orienta-
tions of legal statutes such as the Children’s Code and Hague Convention. 
However, one should also mention that there were, by the mid-1990s, a num-
ber of professionals in the adoption field who, in the course of post-graduate 
studies abroad, had drawn close to international child rights organiza-
tions. For example, one legal specialist who had interned at the Porto Alegre 
Juvenile Court’s adoption service, and subsequently studied in Germany, 
ended up serving as Secretary-Adjunct to the Hague Conference. There, she 
worked alongside a compatriot (who had done her doctorate in France) who 
had supervised intercountry adoptions at the same Porto Alegre Court for 
nearly a decade. Such participants no doubt made an important in-put to 
the Conference’s final document. Returning to pursue their careers in Brazil, 
such experts became faithful disseminators of the Conference’s principles.
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An interview with the coordinator of one of the oldest and most influen-
tial NGOs dealing with adoption in Brazil reveals in greater detail the weaving 
back and forth of actors and ideas. After an early experience working in state-
run juvenile institutions, she had spent two years studying pedagogy in Paris, 
during which time she established contact with an international NGO dealing 
in child welfare throughout the world. Upon returning home, as representa-
tive of this NGO, she invested her energies, up until 1992, in the supervision 
of intercountry adoptions. During the 1990s, however, this activist, following 
the trend of others at the ONG’s international headquarters, turned her ef-
forts toward promoting national adoption, helping to organize, throughout 
the country, a network of locally-based groups composed of present and fu-
ture adoptive parents (Grupos de Apoio à Adoção). As she tells the story, it was 
her partner who, on returning home in 1987 from a stint in Portugal, brought 
with him a new philosophy. Not only should their association be limited to 
national adoptions, it should favor the adoption of difficult-to-place children: 
older, dark-skinned and handicapped youngsters. As in many of these pro-
cesses, it is not always clear where the initial impetus for policy turn comes 
from. Although granting that the European-based head office gave crucial 
financial support to their different programs, my Brazilian interviewee im-
plies that it was she and her partner who exerted a major influence on Swiss 
headquarters, persuading them to integrate this new emphasis on difficult-
to-place youngsters into their work in other Third World countries. 
The “subsidiary” principle, even though directed toward inter-country 
adoption, ended up having an effect on in-country adoptions. Judges and 
other professionals from the adoption field, when justifying placements 
overseas would emphasize that intercountry adoption dealt basically with 
the children no Brazilian would adopt. Repeatedly news articles brought to 
the public’s view cases of foreigners who had adopted pre-adolescents, Afro-
descendents, sibling groups, and even handicapped children. In subtle ways, 
Brazilians were now being portrayed in an unfavorable light, their narrow-
mindedness contrasting with foreign adopters’ generosity. National honor 
was once again at stake, but this time the “enemy” was local prejudice. 
Besides creating special state commissions to deal with intercountry 
adoption, the Brazilian juvenile courts began to vigorously promote national 
adoption. Posters were strategically placed in various public locales; state ju-
venile courts set up special sites on the internet. Evidently, enthusiasm at the 
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time was highly influenced by the recent embargo on intercountry adoption. 
However, despite the 1990s campaigns, in-country adoption in Brazil did not 
at first increase. 
Ironically, this stagnation (or, according to some sources, decline) may 
be due to the precise forces that were designed to better organize legal proce-
dures. With the professionalization of court mediation, independent adop-
tions, arranged directly between birth and adoptive families, became target 
of heavy criticism carrying connotations of various types of abuse and even 
traffic. Although Brazil’s Children’s Code forbids these “direct” procedures in 
the case of intercountry adoptions, legal loopholes allow in-country adopters 
to bypass the court’s team of adoption specialists, arriving in court post ipso 
facto, i.e., to validate a child transfer that has already taken place. 
Today, well into the new millennium, researchers in various parts of the 
country (Ayres 2008, Mariano 2008) report that direct adoptions continue 
to account for over half of all legally sanctioned adoptions. This is an in-
triguingly high proportion despite various efforts to repress the practice. 
Evidently, many Brazilians do not feel comfortable with the rigid procedures 
of court-mediated plenary adoption: the screening of candidates, the refusal 
to allow pre-adoptive contact with the child, the lack of information about 
the child’s origins. It is possible that moralizing campaigns leave potential 
adopters cornered between a discomfort with official procedures and a re-
luctance to engage in the much frowned-upon (if not entirely illegal) “direct” 
adoptions. The net result would be a stagnation in the volume of adoptions 
registered in court.
Another possible motive for the initial “stagnation” in the number of 
adoptions may be related to the same processes that created a “shortage” 
of adoptable children in Europe and North America. During the mid-90s, a 
certain number of government programs (bolsa família, bolsa escola, bolsa ali-
mentação) became available to lower-income families. Rather than summar-
ily withdraw a child from its poverty-stricken home, more and more social 
workers could try out home-based alternatives. Aware that, until very recent-
ly, many children had become available for adoption for reasons of sheer pov-
erty, juvenile authorities became sensitive to accusations that they might be 
“trampling” administrative process, skipping over necessary investigations. 
Since most children put up for adoption by the Children’s Court were not 
voluntarily relinquished, this renovated respect for parental authority was 
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destined to slow the production of adoptable children. A child’s “adoptabil-
ity” would only become apparent when he or she was older and less appealing 
to potential adopters. 
While the tensions between independent and court-mediated adoptions 
remained in abeyance, activists quickly turned their efforts to the second 
problem, of “hard-to-place” or even supposedly unadoptable children. It 
was in this climate that the first adoption support groups – non-profit, phil-
anthropic organizations composed as a rule by volunteers – initiated their 
activities. Growing steadily in number since the mid-90s, holding annual na-
tional encounters since 1996, the support groups number today over a hun-
dred throughout the country. Although they work in close association with 
the Juvenile Courts, the volunteers with which I have had contact represent 
a slightly different perspective from that of the judiciary and its profession-
als. Some bring with them experience from catholic grassroots movements 
(Comunidades Eclesiais de Base or Pastoral do Menor), others invoke the spiritist 
philosophy of charity, some are workers in the adoption field, but most are 
simply adoptive parents who feel passionately about adoption. In one as-
sociation I visited in Brasilia, the pair of founders mentioned they had both 
grown up in families with informally adopted brothers and sisters. 
Although ostensibly these organizations exist to promote adoption, they 
generally assume a broad approach to the problems of institutionalized chil-
dren, insisting on the now globally disseminated philosophy that adoption 
is not aimed at finding a child for a family, but rather at finding a family for a 
child. The organizers, in monthly meetings with prospective adopters, didactic 
brochures, and internet sites, combat typical stereotypes – the ideal, for ex-
ample, of a white infant (generally female), in perfect health, received soon after 
birth, just “as if ” he or she had been born to the adoptive family. In Porto Alegre, 
the support group has the telling name of “Friends of Lucas” (Amigos de Lucas), 
coined by its founders in reference to the companions their own son (a physi-
cally impaired child adopted when he was well past infancy) had left behind at 
the group home – youngsters who, because they were dark-skinned, older or 
suffered physical or emotional handicaps, were considered unadoptable. 
In 1998, an adoption support group, linked to the local university, incor-
porated the term “necessary adoptions” in the organization’s name (Grupo 
de Apoio a Adoções Necessárias). The label had been coined to replace, among 
others, the term “late (or tardy) adoption”, deemed inadequate because of its 
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implication that the norm would be to adopt babies. This was one of the first 
times that the term – used originally to speak of those children adopted by 
foreigners – was clearly directed toward in-country adoptions. The growing 
popularity of this category – now apparent in most national encounters and 
documents dealing with adoption – may or may not have contributed to a 
change in Brazilian habits. According to the statistics published on the web 
by Porto Alegre Juvenile Court, only 20 % of the adoptions they mediated be-
tween 2002 and 2006 concerned infants under one year old, and more than 
one third concerned children over five9. The sporadic reports from other ju-
risdictions are not necessarily as encouraging. Nonetheless, the philosophi-
cal principle of “necessary adoptions”, now espoused by the vast majority 
of professionals and groups working with in-country adoptions, appears to 
have come to stay.
* * * * *
We see then that, during the past twenty years, there have been many 
changes on the Brazilian adoption scene. Thanks to the principle mandating 
that adoption abroad remain a last option, most of the worries pertaining to 
questions of national sovereignty have been successfully addressed. Threats 
concerning the commodification of children – in which youngsters would be 
on display in supermarket fashion for prospective adopters to choose from 
– have been countered through policies of “necessary adoptions”. And the 
potential abuse of authorities, inclined to hastily remove children from their 
poverty-stricken families, has been combated through renewed insistence on 
family preservation as well as a series of government-sponsored family sub-
sidies. 
As long as the questions are limited to a certain, relatively safe terrain 
-- who has priority right to adopt? and which children have a priority right 
to be adopted? -- the mutual education process which occurred in intercoun-
try forums appears to follow a reasonably consensual path. However, there 
remain certain foundational questions: Is adoption the best alternative for 
most institutionalized children? What are the limits to state intervention in-
to adoption transactions? Does adoption necessarily imply a child’s rupture 
9  http://jij.tj.rs.gov.br/jij_site/jij_site.home
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with all pre-adoptive relations? A consideration of these final questions will 
reveal power disputes that do not line up neatly along national interests, and 
that do not produce solutions.
“Local” forces bring birth families into focus
With the “Mothers of Jundiai”, (also, as we will recall, initiated in 1998), 
it became clear that it was not enough simply to redefine the criteria used to 
describe desirable adoptees. Many of the children removed from their fami-
lies by local court were no longer infants and several were darker-skinned. 
News articles made it clear that the injustice, in this case, concerned not the 
type of child adopted, nor even the nationality of who was adopting them. It 
involved the discrimination against parents and other caretakers whose chil-
dren were being taken away for the sole reason of poverty. One cannot fail to 
see the connection between these scandals and the 1999 redirection of rheto-
ric, as announced by the recently founded National Association of Adoption 
Support Groups. The prevention of child abandonment came at the top of the 
new organization’s objectives, and, alongside the usual ends of counseling 
adoptive parents, the founders now made the plea: “(…)Why not help a fam-
ily, and so avoid abandonment This wouldn’t also be a sort of adoption?”10 
For the first time in a decade, adoption as the preferred solution for chil-
dren in institutional care -- a foundational issue in child placement policy 
-- was systematically questioned. Certain support groups began to concen-
trate their efforts on what Brazilians call convivência familiar – a notion that 
could be loosely translated either as “family preservation” or “family-based 
models” of childcare. In fact, the term – already of central importance in the 
1990 Children’s Code – had been around for some time. However, whereas the 
emphasis on family-based models of childcare had been used during most of 
the 90s to justify campaigns in favor of adoption, the notion was now used to 
announce seminars and programs looking for ways to maintain children in 
their original families. 
As part of this new philosophy, the necessity for quality institutional care 
came into focus, considered now as a way to maintain the child’s attachment 
10  Associação Nacional dos Grupos de Apoio à Adoção, ANGAAD, http://angaad.sites.uol.com.br, con-
sulted 25-1-2008.
21
vibrant v.6 n.1  claudia fonseca
to kin and community while social workers invested in the original family. The 
issue of foster families that had been denigrated and all but erased during the 
previous decade, began to find its way onto the agenda of certain policymak-
ers (Uriarte and Fonseca 2009a). Between 2003 and 2008, the country witnessed 
no fewer than six national conferences to discuss issues of fosterage – con-
ferences organized by Brazilian research centers, public authorities, adop-
tion support groups, NGOs, and church-related associations in partnership 
with UNICEF, International Children’s Villages, The International Foster Care 
Organization (IFCO), and the Chapin Hall Center for Children, (University of 
Chicago). Ironically, in a country where the omnipresent informal foster fami-
lies have been largely ignored, international organizations were called in to 
help consolidate what was presented as a new and daring proposal. 
There are grounds to believe that this renewed attention to maintaining 
a child’s place in his or her original family was the product of local activists 
particularly sensitive to issues of inequality close to home. Yngvesson (2004), 
in her analysis of discussions during the 1993 Hague Conference, suggestive-
ly points out that representatives from sending countries (India, Korea, etc.) 
tended to favor a number of local solutions for children in need – including 
temporary institutional care and foster placement. Among these same dele-
gates, the “proprietary logic” underwriting plenary adoption -- in which chil-
dren appear to be born anew (“de-socialized”, given a “clean slate”) by admin-
istratively erasing all pre-adoption history -- provoked serious reservations. 
These reservations were overcome, however, by the convictions of another 
group – led by adoptive parents and agencies in Europe and North America 
– that plenary adoption was most in keeping with a child’s well-being. The 
document’s final draft implies that intercountry adoption is preferable to any 
local solution other than full adoption. If, during the 1990s, Brazilian authori-
ties appeared to mirror the First World enthusiasm for plenary adoption, the 
movement during the early 2000s in favor of alternative solutions to adop-
tion would appear to diverge from the globally hegemonic mood.
It would nonetheless be pertinent to recall that these debates are not 
settled even within the sending countries where the different sides often line 
up according to class and color instead of nationality. In the United States, 
for example, activists from black and indigenous movements have long 
been highly critical of the adoption and fostering services which are seen to 
serve as mechanisms for the appropriation of children from their politically 
22
transnational negotiations of the mechanisms of governance
impotent families of minority origin (Roberts 2002). Despite modest ad-
vances, their efforts suffered a major setback with a 1997 federal bill, the 
Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA). Announcing the failure of most ef-
forts at “family preservation”, this document shifted policymakers’ attention 
to fast-track adoptions. Accusations of negligence, abandonment, and mis-
treatment were no longer needed to justify the termination of parental rights. 
It would be enough for a child to have spent fifteen of the previous 22 months 
in foster care for a state to initiate the process of “freeing” him or her for 
adoption. Critics claim that the Act not only catered to the demand of would-
be adopters (mostly white and middle-class), it also brought a way of moving 
the financial onus out of the public childcare system and into private, self-
supporting families. According to D. Roberts, a Black feminist researcher, 
under the new legislation, adoption was “no longer presented as a remedy for 
a minority of unsalvageable families but as a viable option – indeed the pre-
ferred option – for all children in foster care” (2002: 150). 
A close look at the Brazilian scenario suggests that many of the same 
tensions witnessed in the United States crisscross the domestic mood. 
At the end of 2003, a Brazilian congressman launched a project for a new 
“Adoption Law”, designed to expedite the adoption of institutionalized chil-
dren through financial incentives to adopters and mandatory time limits 
for children in institutional care. Arguments called attention to the great 
number of children in shelters throughout the country11, and to the morose 
judicial system that posed innumerous bureaucratic obstacles to their place-
ment in adoptive families. Backers hoped to see the bill approved by May 25, 
2005 – in time to celebrate “National Adoption” day. They had not foreseen 
the massive reaction that inspired demonstrations throughout the country. 
A manifest, published in March of 2005 and signed by over sixty NGOs, judi-
cial authorities adoption support groups, social work associations, and civic 
councils, argued that the new law not only threatened to violate the rights of 
poverty-stricken parents, but it was drawing attention away from the much 
more pressing concern of family preservation12. Another document, emit-
ted two months later by the National Movement for the Support of Adoption 
11  There are no unified statistics on this population, but, extrapolating on a 2004 study on federally-
funded shelters (Silva, 2004). Newscasters and legislators regularly cite and estimated 80.000-100.000 
children in institutional care.
12  “Manifesto contra o projeto de lei da adoção”, Caderno Especial, n. 14 (29-4-2005 e 13-5-2005). 
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and Family-Living, although technically in favor of the proposal, recom-
mended alterations in the law including detailed measures for family pres-
ervation as well as the absolute priority of “necessary adoptions”13. Facing 
a congressional impasse, the President’s office formed an interministerial 
commission (2004-2006), including participants from various NGOs, judicial 
associations and other child rights organizations (e.g. UNICEF), to lay down 
the lines of a “National plan for the promotion, protection and defense of the 
right of children and adolescents to the maintenance of family and commu-
nity ties”. Not surprisingly, in the commission’s final recommendations, pri-
ority efforts were once again directed toward family preservation, and adop-
tion – of any sort (not just by foreigners) – was classified as an “exceptional” 
measure. Ironically, and furnishing proof that the debate is far from closed, 
a slightly modified version of the Adoption Law was approved three years 
later, in July of 2009.
Beyond state control: the worry surrounding “direct adoptions”
We come now to a second foundational tension in the adoption field – the 
very question of the state’s right to control every step of the process. Disputes 
over the definition of what exactly constitutes “traffic” in adopted children 
revolve around this tension. When does the state have the right and obligation 
to intervene in child placement procedures? When does this intervention con-
stitute an abusive interference? A follow-up study on the Hague Convention, 
requested by the Hague Conference’s Permanent Bureau and carried out by the 
International Social Service (ISS, 2005), singles out a concrete focus for these 
concerns: the persistence of “independent” or “direct adoptions”:
“directly arranged between the child’s birth parents or cares and prospective 
adoptive parents, without the intervention of a professional third party in the 
matching process” (2005: item 6). 
In Brazil, the tension between independent and state-mediated adop-
tions recently came to the fore in a last-minute modification introduced 
into the Adoption Law. In an evident bid to make the bill more acceptable to 
13  “Carta de Goiânia”, 10º Encontro Nacional de Associações e Grupos de Apoio à Adoção, Goiânia, 
maio, 2005.
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congressmen, a clause that criminalized “direct adoptions” was removed a 
few days before the vote14. Thus, still today, despite the constant refinement 
of legal instruments and professional expertise concentrated in the courts, 
there is no legal injunction that prohibits birth mothers and prospective 
adoptive parents from making their own private arrangements. 
It is no accident that, among Brazilian nationals, direct adoptions per-
sist with what to judicial authorities might be seen as maddening obstinacy. 
We mentioned briefly above reasons that prospective adopters may have for 
avoiding the court services. They might foresee discriminatory practices 
that would deny their bid to parenthood on the basis of inadequate income 
or housing, sexual orientation, or seldom-understood psychological evalua-
tions. They might be reluctant to let the courts decide on the child that they, 
sight unseen, should adopt15. Especially those who insist that they want a 
healthy child in early infancy are aware that their preference will not be met 
with sympathy by the authorities, and that they may wait years before their 
turn in line comes up. Birth mothers, on the other hand, evidently have 
their own motives for avoiding the team of judicial workers. It would be 
likely that they associate state services with the images of juvenile offend-
ers and run-down orphanages broadcast in the press. In such circumstances, 
the possibility of participating in the choice of her baby’s parents may be 
experienced by the birth mother as a solace, a way for her to feel that, de-
spite all, she has acted responsibly. Mariano’s ethnographic research (2008) 
among mothers who have given their children in adoption suggests that, 
alongside these concerns, women may also have less “noble” reasons for 
avoiding court services. They might be impatient with possible counseling 
against the child’s “abandonment”; they might be avoiding court investiga-
tions that would turn up an ex-mate or other relatives willing to take the 
child in. And they might be hoping to bargain small gains in exchange for 
their consent to adoption16. 
14  Correio Braziliense, July 15, 2009.
15  To cite but one example, a couple I interviewed describes how, despite their (two) regular incomes 
and their recognized parenting qualities, the court specialists had informed them that they would not 
receive a child unless they moved to a larger apartment in which the youngster would have his or her 
own bedroom. 
16  Mariano (2008) mentions payment of medications, hospital fees and food (fruits, yogurt and other 
expensive items) during pregnancy.
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Yet, despite the number of people opting for direct adoptions, there have 
been amazingly few accusations of “commercializing babies” registered in 
the media or in criminal court over the past few years. Not infrequently, one 
does encounter newspaper headlines such as the following: “Mother gives her 
child [to another]. Judge prohibits adoption”. But, in this case as in most oth-
ers, the accusations carry no connotation that mothers have been pressured 
into “selling” their children17. The “abuse” here is limited to the fact that the 
mother has chosen herself the family that will adopt her child, and the adop-
tive parents have not “waited their turn in line” for a child of anonymous 
origin mediated through juvenile courts. The courthouse internet site for ju-
risprudence in Rio Grande do Sul registers similar episodes in which a public 
prosecutor has branded such child placements as “irregular”, threatening to 
withdraw the child from its adoptive family to be lodged, pending adoption 
procedures through the court, in a group home or shelter. Whereas in previ-
ous times, scandals concentrated on allegations that the child had been bar-
tered (money had exchanged hands), it would appear that, today, it is enough 
to affirm that the adopted parents did not wait their turn on the court’s list of 
adopted children (respeitar o cadastro único) to justify the court’s counteract-
ing intervention. 
This sort of slippage between financial benefit and illegality is echoed 
in both international and national legislation. The Palermo Protocol 
(United Nations, 2000) provides a precise definition for the traffic of per-
sons that includes not only illicit means of recruitment (fraud, coercion, 
or payment) but also the exploitative intentions of intermediaries aiming 
at sexual exploitation, practices of slavery, or the removal of organs (art. 3). 
The Darfur orphans with which we opened this paper would not technical-
ly fall under this definition of “traffic”. Although there were some fleeting 
accusations of wanting the children for pedophilia or extraction of organs, 
it was clear to most concerned that the children were being exported not to 
be commercially exploited, but rather to be raised as sons and daughters in 
European households. 
17  According to this particular news item [Correio do Povo (Porto Alegre),10/4/2009: 7], the adopting 
couple, of modest income, had made arrangements with an acquaintance who was going through an 
unwanted pregnancy. Throughout the brief conflict period, the birth mother insisted she wanted her 
child to go these “friends”, and a court of appeals finally permitted that the child remain with the cho-
sen couple.
26
transnational negotiations of the mechanisms of governance
The crime of the organizers of the Darfur mission would fall under ir-
regularities defined under the Hague Convention (discussed above) or the 
“Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography”, adopted by 
the UN in 2000 and ratified in Brazil, together with the Palermo Protocol, 
in March of 2004. Although the bulk of this latter document is centered on 
sex-related abuse, it sets a broad definition for the sale of children – “any 
act or transaction whereby a child is transferred by any person or group 
of persons to another for remuneration or any other consideration” (art. 
2). Criminal acts extend beyond “remuneration” to “Improperly inducing 
consent, as an intermediary, for the adoption of a child in violation of ap-
plicable international legal instruments on adoption” (art. 3). The Brazilian 
Children’s Code (1990) wraps up the two elements – profit and illegality – 
in the same article (n.239), defining as crime liable to fine and four to six 
years in prison: 
“The promotion or help in the realization of practices aimed at sending a child or 
adolescent abroad in disrespect of legal formalities or with profit in mind.” 
Critical observers will protest that the idea of “With profit in mind” is 
much more complex than it may originally seem (see Zelizer 1985, Howell 
2006). In Brazil, just as in many other “sending countries”, policymakers 
have tried to insulate adoption from commercial influences by concentrat-
ing procedures within Juvenile Courts where services (from counseling to 
home studies) are provided free-of-charge. Nonetheless, by law (ECA art.51, 
par.1), Brazilian juvenile courts must require that candidates to adoptive 
parenthood of foreign nationality present an authorization from compe-
tent authorities as well as a “psychosocial study elaborated by a specialized 
accredited agency in their home country. To assure quality services, agen-
cies – almost always seated in the Northern hemisphere – must stipulate 
professional fees charged to the prospective adoptive parents. In North 
America, where critics have questioned the “non-profit” standing of these 
organizations, more reputable agencies, in a bid for transparency, have 
published standardized fees on their internet home-page. A “modest” esti-
mate runs to tens of thousands of dollars18. And even subsidized European 
18  For example, the home page of Holt International states its 2006 fee: Application $200, Adoption 
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agencies that may dispense with a good part of the service fees imply that 
intercountry adoption is a costly undertaking for prospective parents19. In 
synthesis, the involvement of agencies, entirely in keeping with interna-
tional recommendations (see ISS 2005)20, creates an association that posi-
tions, face-to-face, different philosophies on the legitimate use of money in 
the field of adoption. 
We suggest that the fear of money’s contaminating power, if attenuated 
in certain realms, returns to haunt in others. Thus, scandals concerning the 
“sale” of children take on an instrumental value as they inspire internation-
al regulations and underline the need for state control. The belief that the 
courts -- with their battery of specialists -- are the most efficient guardians 
of a child’s best interests justifies the tremendous centralization of authority 
within the judiciary21. In our analysis of a final foundational issue, we pro-
pose to look at a less-commented side effect of this centralization: the total 
elimination of birth families from the decision-making processes of court-
organized adoptions. 
Associations between no-profit and no-contact 
in the definition of legal irregularities
If, through direct adoption, both birth and adoptive families have reason 
to take initiatives that escape the supervision of judicial authorities, their in-
terests appear to diverge once the child transfer has been legally recognized. 
My own research among adult adoptees (Fonseca 2004, 2009a) suggests that 
whereas birth mothers often welcome information and even contact with 
their child as it grows up, adoptive families view any such contact as a threat. 
Study $2,500-$2,900, Adoption Study Update $300, Dossier Fee $2,795, Adoption Program $5,324-
$17,215, Travel for an escorted child $2,900 - $3,410, Postplacement $1,200 - $1,400, Document 
Processing Service $500 (optional-for China). http://www.holtinternational.org/adoption/fees.shtml, 
consulted 12/10/2008.
19  See, for example, the home-page of AIBI Bras (Amici dei Bambini in Brazil) that estimates the min-
imum cost for adoption of a Brazilian child -- including bureaucracy (translating and certifying docu-
ments, etc.) and travel to Brazil – at nearly US$10,000. http://www.aibi.org.br/biblioteca/documentacao/
custos_da_adocao_internacional.doc, consulted 31/12/2007.
20  In other words, international regulations allow for the legitimate use of money in specific circum-
stances
21  See Howell (2006) for a recent take on the complexity of «a child’s best interest».
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Adoptive parents fear that contact may lead to demands from the birth fam-
ily for financial support. They fear that, if exposed to its original family, the 
child will be traumatized – either by guilt or by divided loyalties. Above all, 
they fear that the birth mother, having improved in life, might want her 
child back22. To allay these fears, many prospective adopters – even in direct 
adoptions – prefer to go through intermediaries (in general, a lawyer), in 
the hopes that no “identifying information” (names, photos, addresses) will 
make its way into the hands of the birth family”23.
Hegemonic interpretations of international legislation tend to coincide 
with the adoptive parents` point of view, presenting plenary adoption and its 
principle of total rupture between a child’s pre and post-adoptive relations 
as a self-evident truth. The above-mentioned ISS document, implying that 
independent adoptions are conducive to commercial interests and therefore 
contrary to a child’s priority interests, expands upon the importance of the 
“no-contact” principle as laid out in the Hague Convention. The Convention 
puts a time restriction on recommended control: there should be no contact 
between birth and prospective adoptive parents before accredited intermedi-
aries do the matching and go through all the necessary preliminary proce-
dures (art. 29). The ISS document suggests that even after the fulfillment of 
legal requirements, any contact would be “non compatible with the spirit” of 
the Hague Convention. Citing the Conference’s original Explanatory Report to 
the Hague Convention, it stipulates a radical and permanent ban on any sort of 
communication between birth and adoptive parents:
“article 29 sanctions, as a rule, the prohibition of contacts in general terms, 
therefore including not only ‘direct, unsupervised” contacts, but also ‘indirect’ 
or ‘supervised’ contacts (supposedly: visits, postal mail, phone calls, faxes, 
emailing). (ISS, 2005: 14)” 
In the ISS document, “no-profit” is conflated with the notion of “no-
contact”, which – in a particular chain of associations -- is seen as more in 
keeping with the rights of the child. Pre-adoption contact blurs into post-
22  Abreu e Oliveira (2009) recount how, at the juvenile court they studied, many of the duly- regis-
tered potential adopters had been through na experience of direct adoption that had failed for such 
reasons.
23  The margin of negotiation for the legal payment of professionals in the adoption field once again 
contrasts with the zero tolerance for the possible compensation of birth mothers. 
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adoption contact, calling on the all-prevailing fear of commodification to 
justify measures that appear to extend well beyond the major risks. 
In recent years, there has been a growing number of “roots trips” dur-
ing which adoptees grown to maturity in Europe or North America return to 
their native countries where they meet with birth relatives (see, for example, 
Yngvesson 2007). Such practices have no doubt contributed to a rethinking 
of the seeming imperative of rupture. However, another equally important, 
albeit less visible, practice may be making even more serious inroads on the 
“no-contact” principle. In a procedure that should remind policy-makers 
that rules do not carry over automatically from the global to the local (or 
from transnational to national context), direct adoptions within the national 
setting simply outskirt court mediation, underlining a sort of “grass-roots” 
resistance to what, to some, may appear as arbitrary policies dictated by dis-
tant authorities. 
Thus, we end with a provocative hypothesis: that international guide-
lines, designed to forestall a “baby market” in intercountry adoption take 
on new connotations when applied to in-country adoption, repressing the 
limited forms of agency that birth mothers traditionally enjoyed. Ironically, 
at a time when, in the United States and Europe, sealed records and “closed” 
adoption are being seriously questioned (Samuels 2001, Carp 2004, Martre 
2009, Fonseca 2009b), international debates appear to narrow control in an 
attempt to inhibit such practices. Whereas other problems in the field of 
intercountry adoption have been openly discussed, leading to consensual 
change, there has been a lot of hard work invested in “black-boxing”24 this 
element of the process -- the principle of no contact between birth and adop-
tive families. The idea of “rupture” between a child and its birth family slips 
in as a self-evident element of plenary adoption, taken as part and parcel of 
the full, permanent and irrevocable incorporation of the child into its adop-
tive family. Yet, the persistence of direct or independent adoptions (in Brazil 
and elsewhere) serves as an indication that “modern” legal orientations are 
not to the liking of all concerned, and as a reminder to analysts that plenary 
adoption, just as other seemingly-consensual matters, reflects the result of 
extended power plays between actors with uneven political clout.
24  Latour 1987.
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Final remarks
M. Goodale (2002:64), in his effort to understand the impact of Western hu-
man rights discourse on rural Bolivians, underlines the complexity of legal 
anthropology in the present, globalized era. In order to ethnographically 
trace the different vectors that constitute the notion of “proper legal behav-
ior”, his recommendation is to “follow the ideas”—not those circumscribed 
by a village or a courtroom -- but rather those that are negotiated through 
a network of relationships established by common interests, and extending 
well beyond any “local” space.
In this article, I have taken a similar approach, singling out mediating 
forces – the press, individual actors, and collective movements as well as 
legal and bureaucratic technologies -- that connect national and interna-
tional discussions in the field of adoption. Working through the Jundiai inci-
dent, we have seen how a demand presented by European adopters, handled 
through European adoption agencies and a particular Brazilian judge, trig-
gered a collective protest that, despite being small-scale and short-lived, was 
carried by the national media into the lives of most Brazilian citizens. The 
coincidence of timing between this protest and Brazil’s final signing of the 
Hague document, as well as the subsequent implementation of bureaucratic 
mechanisms to regulate intercountry adoption of Brazilian children, sug-
gests ways in which local events influence a nation’s reception of interna-
tional legislation. However, the very idea that international legislation is an 
“external influence” appears somewhat doubtful when we recognize that a 
number of “local” actors, drawn from the ranks of Brazilian specialists, have 
participated in the formulation of these documents. The network of ONGs, in 
constant interaction with policy-makers at both local and international lev-
els, likewise involves concrete actors who mediate the flow of ideas from side 
to the other of transactions in intercountry adoption.
Intercountry adoption has undoubtedly been a major vector for the in-
troduction of new elements into Brazil’s official policies on in-country child 
placements as well as domestic adoption. In a first period, the very tighten-
ing of legal control over adoption procedures came as a reaction to what was 
seen as a threat by foreign adopters. Subsequent debate in the international 
arena, fueled largely by protests from “sending countries”, helped consoli-
date the subsidiary principle in which only hard-to-place children would be 
available for intercountry adoption. Finally, the faithful application of this 
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principle, which riveted attention on the older and darker children adopted 
into European and North American homes, brought Brazilian activists to for-
mulate a policy (relevant for in-country as well as intercountry adoption) on 
“necessary adoptions”. 
Throughout the discussion, it has been evident that “global influences” 
are as complex and varied as are their national counterparts. In Brazil, a re-
action against adoption as a global panacea to poverty, expressed by child 
rights activists as well as certain of the Adoption Support Groups, lent sup-
port to alternative solutions, including foster homes and quality institutional 
care, that would permit children to maintain contact with their original 
families and communities. Whereas orientations from international legisla-
tion consistently nudged legislators toward plenary adoption, these activists 
found political allies and some financial backing among various internation-
al institutes and NGOs.
Yet, as we move into what we have called foundational question in the 
adoption field, the distinction between national and international influences 
appears less telling than suggestive parallels in tense debates taking place in 
different parts of the globe. What weight should be given to adoption as op-
posed to other childcare policies to guarantee the well-being of children at 
risk? Should government control all steps of the adoption procedure through 
their specialized services or should independent adoptions be tolerated, giv-
ing birth parents and adoptive families a greater say in the process? Before, 
during and after the adoption, how should information be processed? Should 
birth and adoptive families be permitted an exchange of news or even a cer-
tain supervised contact? These are questions that provoke new oppositions, 
not between “sending” and “receiving” nations, but between birth families 
(working through ONGs and some child rights activists) and adoptive par-
ents, between poverty-stricken minorities and the affluent classes, between 
adopters and court specialists, and between adoptees and their own adoptive 
parents. 
Radical political and economic inequalities that are part of most adop-
tion practices are particularly apparent in transnational adoption where the 
juxtaposition of different legal codes and value systems serves to highlight 
paradoxes. It is thus not surprising that news vehicles latch onto scandals 
in transnational adoption, nor that international legislation is particularly 
concerned with abuse in this domain. However, when thinking through the 
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concrete policies that result from these concerns, national policymakers 
would do well to remember that tensions pervade the child placement pro-
cess from top to bottom (from transnational adoption to institutional shel-
ters and traditional forms of child circulation) and, given the diversity of in-
terests and complexity of alliances through which it is mediated, the spirit of 
the law – transformed, translated, modified – does not travel with impunity 
from one site to the other. 
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